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MODELING ALTERNATE STRATEGIES FOR 
AIRLINE REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
 
Kapil Joshi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Ever since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, fierce competition has 
made every airline to try and gain a competitive edge in the market. In order to 
accomplish this, airlines are turning to advanced optimization techniques such as revenue 
management. Revenue management is a way for airlines to maximize capacity and 
profitability by managing supply and demand through price management. 
 Over the last few years research in the field of revenue management has steadily 
progressed from seat inventory control techniques such as single leg seat inventory and 
network inventory control to ticket pricing techniques. Ticket pricing techniques involve 
setting ticket prices according to the time remaining to depart and inventory level 
conditions at that point in time. These models can be solved either by dynamic or 
mathematical programming. However, these models in addition to having increased 
complexity are based on several assumptions which may not be valid in real life 
situations thereby limiting there applicability 
 In this research, we have developed computer simulation models using Arena 
software as a tool to solve airline revenue management problem. Different models based 
on factors such as customer behavior, which would involve the probability of a customer 
accepting a ticket and relevant pricing methods such as seats remaining and time 
 vii 
remaining have been developed with the objective to reach an optimal revenue 
management policy. 
Initially, the strategies have been developed and tested for a single flight leg for 
different types of destinations such as tourist, business and mixed tourist and business. It 
was found that models where pricing was based on seats remaining generated the most 
revenue for the tourist destinations, time remaining for the business destinations and 
pricing based on time and seats remaining for the mixed type. Two different strategies, 
one where the ticket price for the indirect (stop-over) flight increases as more seats for 
direct flight are sold and the second where the ticket price for the indirect flight decreases 
have been developed for a network of three cities with direct and stop-over flights. It was 
found that the first strategy works well for the business destination. There was no 
significant difference between the two strategies for the other two destinations. Also the 
model was run where a set percentage of seats on the direct flight are sold prior to the 
opening of indirect flight bookings (blocking). It was found that blocking of seats did not 
increase the total revenue generated.    
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The airline industry has become extremely competitive in recent years. The 
number of airlines operating within the United States has increased tremendously. Since 
the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, airlines have been allowed to choose their 
own market segments, decide their own routes and set their own fares as long as they 
comply with the regulations laid down by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) [Yu, 
1998]. This fierce competition has made most airlines turn to advanced optimization 
techniques to develop decision support systems for management and control of airline 
operations. 
An important aspect considered in any airline industry is the maximization of 
revenue from the sale of seats in the aircraft. This is called revenue management. 
Originally known as yield management, revenue management has been successfully 
adapted to numerous industries in recent years including utilities, cruise lines, trucking, 
amusement parks, hotels, rental cars and others.  
Revenue management is a business practice that enables companies to increase 
revenue by accurately matching product availability and pricing to the market demand. 
Basic principle of revenue management is to maximize the revenue by controlling 
inventory levels and pricing of perishable products. 
Airline revenue management other than the maximization of revenue allows an 
airline a chance to operate a large variety of fares so as to enhance the attractiveness of 
that airline to the consumers. 
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1.1 Revenue Management in the Airline Industry 
Over the years airline revenue management systems have progressed from simple 
leg control through segment control and finally to the origin-destination or network 
control. The problem of revenue management is divided into Seat or Discount Allocation 
and Ticket Pricing. 
 
1.1.1 Seat or Discount Allocation 
Also known as seat inventory control, it is the determination of optimal booking 
limits for the seats in each fare class such that total revenue is maximized. Two 
approaches namely single leg control and network control have been explored till now. In 
single leg control the flights legs are optimized separately or one at a time where as in 
network inventory control all the flight legs including connecting and direct flights 
between a pair of cities are optimized simultaneously. Hence, network revenue 
management is to manage the sales of ticket to local passengers as well as connecting 
passengers in order to maximize revenue for the entire airline network. Typically in case 
of all major airlines 25 - 50% of passengers will have at least one connection. Thus when 
connecting traffic is a significant portion of total traffic, leg based revenue management 
can result in allocation that are clearly sub-optimal. 
Seats on an aircraft are categorized as Executive class with high fares and 
Economy class with low fares. However if you consider the economy section of the 
aircraft, although all seats are physically identical they are never priced identically. This 
gives rise to different fare classes. 
So the question is how to and how many tickets to sell within the coach class to 
different customers. In the seat inventory control approach it is assumed that prices for 
different fare classes are given according to some predetermined criteria and only seat 
allocation needs to be determined so as to maximize the total revenue. A system called 
nested reservation system [Belobaba, 1989] for determining booking limits for the fare 
classes is the most common system used by airlines today.  
A nested reservation system is one in which fare class inventories are structured 
such that a high fare request will not be refused as long as any seats remain available in 
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lower fare classes. A nested reservation system is thus binding in its limits on lower fare 
classes but its limits are transparent from above (for higher fare classes). Booking limit 
for a fare class is maximum number of seats that can be sold for that fare class. For 
example, if a three-fare class nested reservation system is considered then the booking 
limit for the highest fare class will be the total capacity of the cabin and the next fare 
class will have the booking limit equal to the total cabin capacity less the seats protected 
for the higher fare class from the lower classes. 
By having a nested reservation system the airline ensures that higher fare class 
demands are always accepted as long as there are seats available in the cabin. In a nested 
reservation system the difference between the binding limit of a higher fare class and 
binding limit of the immediate lower class is called the protection level for the higher fare 
class. These are the seats that are reserved or protected from sale in the lower classes. 
It is desirable for the airline to sell as many tickets in the highest fare class as 
possible. But just increasing number of seats that are allocated for the highest fare class 
would not be beneficial because some of the seats in the highest fare class may remain 
vacant when the flight takes off thus generating no revenue. On the other hand had these 
seats been allocated to a lower fare class for which there may possibly be more demand 
than a higher fare class, more revenue would have been generated. Hence objective of the 
airline is to allocate seats for each fare class such that the mix of seats sold on the aircraft 
generates max revenue. 
 
1.1.2 Overbooking 
If an airline accepts reservations only for the number of seats available then there 
is always a risk of flight departing with vacant seats because of cancellations or ‘no 
shows.’ However if the airline sells seats more than its capacity, then there is a possibility 
that the airline may have to bump some ticket holding passengers. Such passengers are 
usually rebooked on a later flight and given some compensation. However there is a loss 
of good will and a bumping cost is incurred. Usually a fixed percentage is used as an 
overbooking factor.  
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1.1.3 Ticket Pricing 
Differential pricing is the determination of prices for each class of tickets such 
that the total revenue is maximized. The profit maximization price of a ticket depends on 
market reactions and marginal cost, i.e., both the market and the company’s internal 
structures are determinants of a ticket price. There are two key elements to a price: the 
market side or the demand and supplier side or supply [Yeoman and Ingold, 1997]. 
Market side is the relative perceived value of a product and the consumer’s 
willingness and the ability to buy the product. Sales volume represents the amount 
consumed at various price levels and when combined with the value (price) indicates the 
turnover generated. This relationship reflects the principles of the demand curve D1 
shown in Figure 1 [Yeoman and Ingold, 1997]. Here P1 and P2 on the Y-axis represent 
the two price levels, P2 being a greater price than P1 and Q1, Q2 and Q3 on the X-axis 
represent the sales volume wherein Q3 is the most number of seats sold, Q2 least and Q1 
in between them.  
The total turnover is calculated by multiplying Q1 and P1 or Q2 and P2. The 
revenue can be increased in two ways, either lower prices and raise volumes or raise 
prices and accept lower volumes. These are called movements along the demand curve. 
As demand is an independent variable, these movements can only result in an increase or 
decrease in price. This figure basically represents the price elasticity and explains the 
relationship between a change in price and change in quantity demanded.   
The main thing to be considered here is that the price-volume relationship can 
vary considerably between and even within markets, making the pricing decision 
difficult, yet critical. In addition to such movements along the demand curve, the curve 
can also shift to the right or left. When the demand curve shifts to the right (D2), it 
represents an increase in demand, whereas a shift to the left (D1) represents reduced 
demand. The cases of such shifts arise due to changing business environments such as 
good marketing, offering promotional fares, lower rates offered by competing airlines etc. 
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 D1 D2 
P2 
  
P1   
  
                    Q2           Q1        Q3   Quantity 
            Figure 1 The Demand Curve 
Hence, a shift in the demand curve to the right can result in a greater revenue 
generation without a reduction in price (D2) or a potential to raise price and maintain 
volume, perhaps raising profitability.    
 
1.2 Characteristics of Revenue Management  
The characteristics of revenue management are 
1. Relatively fixed capacity. Only a fixed amount of capacity is available and cannot 
be easily added or reduced, e.g. an aircraft has fixed number of seats due to cabin 
restrictions and a hotel has fixed number of rooms when it is built. 
2. Perishable inventory. This means there is a deadline up to which the inventory 
can be sold. After that the inventory is worthless jus t like food items and cannot 
be reused. The seats on an aircraft after it takes off cannot be sold and will not 
generate any revenue. 
3. Fluctuating demand.  In most service industries demand is seasonal. Revenue 
management can be used to generate more demand than usual during off-peak 
periods and can help to increase revenue during peak demand period. 
4. Product differentiation. This important characteristic is the main reason for a 
price differential. In the coach class of an aircraft even though the seats are 
physically the same, they cost different as the two individuals occupying the seats 
have purchased them at a different point in time. 
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1.3 Revenue Management in Other Industries 
  Since American Airlines pioneered revenue management, many industries have 
tried to adopt it. Not far behind the airline industry are the hotel industry and the rental 
car industry. Cruise lines and tour operators are looking at revenue management too. The 
movie industry and on the same lines the sporting industry would hugely benefit from 
revenue management. 
 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
  The organization of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the prior 
work done in the area of airline revenue management. Chapter 3 states the problem of 
airline revenue management and also discusses the major assumptions that have been 
made with their justifications. Chapter 4 discusses the modeling approach and the two 
main factors namely pricing structure and customer behavior that affect the model. 
Chapter 5 presents the results for a single flight leg model and an analysis of variance is 
conducted to verify significant factors. Chapter 6 presents the strategies used in the 
modeling of a network of three cities with direct and stop-over flights between them and 
also present their results. Finally, Chapter 7 gives the summary and conclusions and also 
states the further research that can be done in this area.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  This chapter presents an overview of the research done by various authors in the 
area of revenue management. Most of the material presented in this chapter is adapted 
from two excellent reviews of airline revenue management by McGill and VanRyzin 
[1999] and Pak and Piersma [2002]. As stated before the problem has been more or less 
divided into the seat inventory control problem and the ticket-pricing problem.  
 
2.1 Seat Inventory Control 
  The seat inventory control problem involves allocation of finite seat inventory to 
the demand that occurs over time before the flight is scheduled to depart. Here the 
objective is to find the right mix of passengers to maximize the revenue. The problem is 
approached either as single leg seat inventory control or as network inventory control.   
 
2.1.1 Single Leg Seat Inventory Control 
  Here the flight legs are optimized separately. Consider a passenger traveling from 
A to C through B and offering to pay $800 for his entire journey. That is, traveling from 
A to C using flight legs from A to B and from B to C. It is assumed that the airline is 
charging this passenger $500 for the first flight leg from A to B and $300 for the second 
flight leg from B to C. Now consider a second passenger traveling from A to B and 
offering to pay $600 for his journey. If the single leg approach is used, the first passenger 
can be rejected on the flight leg from A to B because the second passenger is willing to 
pay a higher fare on this flight leg and the airline stands to increase its revenue by $100. 
But by rejecting the first passengers offer, the airline looses an opportunity to create 
revenue for the combination of the two flight legs. But if the second flight leg from B to 
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C did not get filled up, then it could have been more profitable to accept the first 
passenger to create revenue for both flight legs. This is the main drawback of the single 
leg inventory control. Bandla [1998] proposes a solution for such an approach using 
reinforcement learning. There are two categories of single leg solution methods: static 
and dynamic solution methods. 
 
2.1.1.1 Static Solution Methods  
  In a static model a booking period is regarded as a single interval and a booking 
limit for every booking class is set at the beginning of every booking period. A drawback 
of the static solution method is that it considers all the bookings done up to and at a 
particular point in time and as we know the booking process is a continuous one. Hence 
this is not exactly an optimal approach although it is a popular one as it can handle large 
problems and also multiple leg problems. 
  Littlewood [1972] was the first to propose a solution method for the airline 
revenue management problem for a single flight leg with two fare classes. His idea was to 
equate the marginal revenue in each of the two fare classes. He suggests closing down the 
low fare class when the revenue from selling another low fare seat exceeds the expected 
revenue of selling the same seat at a higher fare. Belobaba [1987] extends Littlewood’s 
rule to multiple fare classes and introduces the term expected marginal seat revenue 
(EMSR). His method is called EMSRa and incorporates nested protection level, i.e., the 
number of seats to be sold to each fare class. However his method does not yield optimal 
booking limits when more than two fare classes are considered. 
 
2.1.1.2 Dynamic Solution Methods  
  Dynamic solution methods for the seat inventory control problem do not 
determine a booking control policy at the start of the booking period as the static solution 
methods do. A dynamic model sets the booking limit for each booking class according to 
the actual bookings throughout the entire booking process. However a limitation of this 
approach is that the model developed is computationally intensive. 
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  Lee and Hersh [1993] consider a discrete time dynamic programming model. A 
non-homogenous Poisson process models demand for each fare class. Use of Poisson 
process gives rise to Markov Decision Process model where in booking requests at time t 
are independent of the decisions made before time t, except available capacity. The entire 
booking period is divided in to a number of decision periods and each request constitutes 
a period. The decision rule says that a booking request is accepted only if its fare exceeds 
the expected cost of seats at time t. Multiple seat bookings, which are a practical issue in 
airline seat inventory control are also considered. Subramanian et al [1999] also 
formulate and analyze a Markov Decision Process model for airline seat allocation on a 
single leg flight with multiple fare classes. They have incorporated cancellations, no 
shows and overbooking. 
  Lautenbacher and Stidham [1999] link the dynamic and static approaches of the 
single leg seat inventory control model. They demonstrate that a common Markov 
Decision process underlies both the approaches and formulate an omnibus model that 
yields the static and dynamic models as special cases. 
     
2.1.2 Network Inventory Control 
  Network seat inventory control is aimed at optimizing the complete network of 
flight legs offered by the airline simultaneously. As explained in the example in Section 
2.1.1 Single Leg Seat Inventory Control, consider that the second flight leg from B to C 
do not get filled up. The first passenger flying from A to C, was obviously paying more 
than the second passenger traveling from A to B for the entire journey, but was still 
rejected. Hence the airline would be flying with an empty seat on flight leg B to C and 
thereby losing potential revenue on flight leg B to C. In this process the airline increased 
its revenue by $100. However if the first passenger was accepted, then there would be no 
vacant seats on any of the flight legs and the airline would have increased its revenue by 
$200 instead. Thus accepting the first passenger would maximize total revenue of both 
the flight legs. This is network revenue management. Network inventory control takes in 
to account the overall revenue the passenger creates from its origin to its destination. 
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Singh [2002] proposes a stochastic approximation approach to such an airline network 
revenue management problem and solves it using reinforcement learning algorithm. 
 
2.2 Ticket Pricing Models 
  It is now common for airline practitioners to view pricing as part of the revenue 
management process. The reason for this is pretty clear - the existence of differential 
pricing for airline seats is the starting point of airline revenue management and price is 
generally the most important determinant of passenger demand behavior. There is also a 
natural duality between price and seat allocation decisions. If price is viewed as a 
variable that can be controlled on a continuous basis, raising the price sufficiently high 
can shut down a booking class. Also when there are many booking classes available, 
shutting down a booking class can be viewed as changing the price structure faced by the 
customer. 
 
2.2.1 Dynamic Pricing Models  
  Treatments of revenue management as a dynamic pricing model can be found in 
the work done by Carvalho and Puterman [2003]. They considered a problem of setting 
prices dynamically to maximize expected revenues in a finite horizon model in which the 
demand distribution parameters are unknown. The authors suggests a promising pricing 
policy called the “one step look ahead rule” where in a Taylor series expansion of the 
future reward function illustrates the tradeoff between short term revenue management 
and future information gains. 
  Chatwin [1999] proposes an optimal dynamic pricing model of perishable 
products with stochastic demand. A finite set of allowable prices is assumed. A 
continuous time dynamic programming model is employed in which at any given time 
the state of the model is the number of items in the inventory and the retailer’s decision is 
to choose the price to sell at. Demand is assumed to be Poisson with decreasing rate. This 
model verifies the intuition that optimal price is non- increasing in the remaining 
inventory and non-decreasing in the time to go. Gallego and Van Ryzin [1994] suggest a 
dynamic pricing policy of inventories with stochastic demand. Their formulation uses 
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intensity control and obtains structural monotonic results for the optimal price as a 
function of the stock level and the amount of time left. However they allow only a finite 
number of prices. 
  Feng and Gallego [1995] investigate the problem of deciding the optimal timing 
of a single price change from a given initial price to either a given lower or higher second 
price. They show that the optimal policy is to decrease the initial price as soon as the time 
to go falls below a time threshold which depends on the number of yet unsold items. 
While the model is realistic for retailers of seasonal goods and for certain nonstop flights, 
it does not extend to multiflight, multileg situation where customers from different 
itineries compete for the capacity of the flight legs. Feng and Xiao [2000a] generalize the 
results from the above policy by incorporating risk analysis and multiple price changes. 
Also Feng and Gallego [2000] also extend their original work to address the problem of 
deciding the optimal timing of price change within a given menu of allowable, possibly 
time dependent price paths each of which is associated with a general Poisson process 
with Markovian, time dependent predictable intensities. 
  Feng and Xiao [2000b] present a continuous time yield management model with 
multiple prices and reversible changes in price. Demand at each price is Poisson with 
constant intensities. The problem is formulated as an intensity control model and optimal 
solution in closed form is derived. The model further improves the one proposed in Feng 
and Gallego [1995], as an exact solution rather than a deterministic one is obtained. 
Gallego and VanRyzin [1997] also propose a multi product dynamic pricing problem 
with its application to network yield management. They start with a demand for each 
product, which is a stochastic point process with an intensity that is a vector of the prices 
of the products and the time at which they are offered. An upper bound for the optimal 
expected revenue is established by analyzing the deterministic version of the problem. 
  From the review of the literature done in this chapter it can be summarized that 
most of the research that has been done is in the area of seat inventory control which 
again could be categorized in to single leg and network seat inventory control. Whatever 
little has been done in the field of ticket pricing has been using mathematical or dynamic 
programming models that are computationally intensive and time consuming. Also most 
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of these models are fairly complicated and they make simplifying assumptions such as 
pre-determined prices, no batch/multiple seat bookings, stochastic demand, fixed number 
of seats assigned to each fare class, lower fare class requests arrive before higher fare 
class requests etc. Hence the validity of these models is under question and their exact 
solutions may not be worked out. In the next chapter we state our research objectives 
along with the parameters and the assumptions made. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH STATEMENT 
 
In this chapter the problem of network revenue management is stated.  The main 
objectives of this research are also discussed. The major assumptions that have been 
made are explained with their justifications.  
 
3.1 Problem Statement 
 The problem considered in this research constitutes a network of three cities with 
multiple origin-destination combinations. There are direct and stop-over flights in 
between them. The revenue generated from the sale of tickets on all flights in their coach 
class in the network is to be maximized. Passengers request reservations in the coach 
class of the flight depending upon their preferred itineraries. Every time a passenger 
requests a reservation, the airline checks for the availability of seats for that itinerary. If 
seats are available, the airline provides the passenger with a fare and the passenger 
decides whether to accept or reject the fare.  
 Customer arrivals are assumed to follow a non-stationary Poisson process (an 
arrival process, which has a rate that varies over time). The objective here is to maximize 
the revenue generated from sale of seats over the entire network. Also policies to be 
followed for the sale of tickets on the direct and the stop-over flight for the same final 
destination have to be developed. 
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3.2 Research Assumptions  
The following parameters have been considered in this research 
· Network Details 
A network of three cities has been considered in this research. Only one-way travel 
between the cities is considered for modeling purposes and no round trip fare option 
is offered. However the return part of the journey could be modeled as a percentage 
of the cost of the first part of the journey and it would be also dependent on the date 
of the return trip. A request for a booking is always associated with a particular 
origin-destination. For example consider a network of three cities namely Tampa, 
Atlanta and New York. A flight from Tampa to New York via Atlanta (stop-over 
flight) would be a different origin destination combination from a flight flying 
directly between Tampa and New York (direct flight).   
· Fair Structure 
The range of fares for different origin destination combinations is different and is pre-
determined. Considering the above example the range of fares for a flight from 
Tampa to New York via Atlanta would be different from the fares for a direct flight 
between the two cities. Hence the fare structure would vary depending on whether it 
is a direct flight or with a layover and also factors such as the distance between the 
cities etc. 
· Arrival Process 
Many systems are subject to experience arrival loads that can vary dramatically over 
the time frame of the simulation. There is a specific probabilistic model for this called 
the non-stationary Poisson process, which provides an accurate way to reflect time- 
varying arrival patterns. Hence the passengers in our model are assumed to arrive 
with a nonstationary Poisson process and each origin destination combination has its 
own arrival process. 
 
3.3 Factors and Strategies Considered 
Three main factors and three individual strategies will be considered in this 
model. The factors are pricing strategy, acceptance probability and customer arrival rate. 
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3.3.1 Pricing Strategy 
The pricing strategy basically means the different ways the customer is charged a 
price. This could be categorized on the basis of the time left to depart (time remaining 
strategy), or up on the number of seats left to be sold, i.e. seats remaining strategy or 
could be a combination of both called the hybrid strategy.  
 
3.3.2 Acceptance Probability 
Acceptance Probability reflects up on the probability that a customer will 
purchase a ticket. It could be classified according to the price being offered to the 
customer or probability w.r.t. price strategy or according to time left to depart called 
probability w.r.t. time strategy or could be a combination of both called composite 
probability.  
 
3.3.3 Customer Arrival Rate 
Three different customer arrival rates of low, medium and high each suggesting a 
market with a low demand, medium and high demand for tickets has been experimented 
with. 
  
3.4 Research Objectives 
Our objective is to develop an optimal ticket pricing policy for the airline 
industry. Different pricing strategies such as seats remaining, time remaining, and hybrid 
strategy as well as acceptance strategies such as probability of a customer buying a seat 
with respect to time, price or a combination of both are developed and tested using 
simulation models. Initially the pricing policy is developed for a single flight leg and then 
for a network of cities to explore the alternatives for direct and indirect flights that 
airlines can offer to maximize their revenue. The comparison of results from these 
strategies can help in determining the optimal ticket pricing policy for the airline 
industry.  
The factors considered and the strategies used is presented in the next chapter and 
explained in detail with the aid of an example.  
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CHAPTER 4 
MODELING AND SOLUTION METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter discusses in detail the main factors that are used in the development 
of a single leg model. The three main factors are the pricing strategy, acceptance 
probability and customer arrival rate. 
 
4.1 Pricing Strategy 
The pricing strategy that we have used in this research is based on the prices 
being offered online by some popular airlines. Generally it was observed that the price of 
a fare for a 30-day period varied from 2 times to a maximum of 3 times the cheapest fare. 
However what is more interesting is as to how these prices are offered to the customers 
and at what point of time in to the booking period. The pricing strategy can be explained 
using three different approaches. 
 
4.1.1 Time Remaining Approach 
 At the start of the booking period, when the entire capacity of the aircraft is 
available and in order to attract more customers to sell as many seats as possible, airlines 
offer the cheapest fares. The fares go on increasing as the time to depart nears and the 
number of seats available becomes less. In such a scenario last minute customers will end 
up paying the most expensive fares the airline has to offer. The relationship between time 
remaining and price offered is a linear one and is shown in Figure 2. The equation that 
describes this relationship is as follows. 
Price Offered = Pmax – (Time Remaining) * j                                                        (1) 
where, 
Price Offered is the price at which the ticket is sold to the customer. 
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Pmax  is the maximum ticket price set by the airline. 
Pmin  is the minimum ticket price set by the airline. 
Time Remaining is the time left for the flight to depart.  
j is a normalizing constant such that Price Offered will be Pmin  ,  when Time Remaining is 
30 days.  
This equation satisfies our initial condition that price offered is least at the start of the 
booking period and is the highest when the flight is about to depart. 
 
4.1.2 Seats Remaining Approach 
 When the entire seat inventory is available at hand and in order to kick-start the 
booking process, the cheapest fare is offered. The price goes on increasing as the number 
of seats reduces and the last seat is offered at the highest price. The relationship which is 
linear is shown in Figure 3. The equation used is as follows  
Price Offered =  Pmax – (Seats Remaining) * k                                                     (2) 
where in, 
Seats remaining are the number of seats still available for sale at that time.   
k is a normalizing constant such that Price Offered will be Pmax  ,  when Seats Remaining 
will be zero. 
                
Price  Price 
 
 
 
  
      
 
 Time Remaining            Seats Remaining     
        Figure 2. Graph of Price Offered and        Figure 3. Graph of Price Offered and  
                        Remaining Time                                             Remaining Seats               
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This equation also satisfies the conditions that price offered is lowest when most of the 
seats are remaining and vice versa. 
 
4.1.3 Hybrid Approach 
Both the approaches are logical in their own ways. However consider the case 
when after a few days in to the booking period, very few or almost no seats are sold. The 
first approach would entail the airline to charge a higher price as the time to depart nears 
where as the second approach would require the airline to charge a lower price since very 
few seats were sold. Hence the need for a hybrid model was felt. The hybrid approach 
would charge fares depending on the number of seats sold as well as the number of days 
into the booking period. Here we use the equation 
Price Offered = Pmax  - (Time Remaining) * j – (Seats Remaining) * k                (3) 
where,  
j and k are normalizing constants such that Price Offered is Pmax,, when Time Remaining 
is equal to the booking period and Seats Remaining is close to zero.                    
 
4.2 Acceptance Probability 
The probability of a customer accepting or rejecting a seat is called acceptance 
probability and this probability can be classified into three different types depending up 
on the price and the time at which the customer accepts it and their combination. 
 
4.2.1 Probability with Respect to Price Offered 
 If a lower price is offered by the airline, the tickets are likely to be sold easily. 
Hence a very high acceptance probability is assumed when the cheapest fare is offered. 
However, as the fare increases, the probability of acceptance decreases leading to the 
lowest probability when the fare offered is the highest. The equation used is 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered –Cheapest Price)*l               (4) 
where,  
l is the normalizing constant such that Probability of Acceptance is 100% when Price 
Offered is the Cheapest Price.  
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This equation will return a 100% probability of acceptance when price offered is the 
lowest and vice versa. Figures 4 and 5 show the graphs of the probability of acceptance 
with respect to the price offered and time remaining respectively. 
 
Prob. of                                                     Prob. of 
Acceptance                             Acceptance 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
                                    Price               Time Remaining 
Figure 4 Graph of Probability of                Figure 5 Graph of Probability of  
Acceptance and Price Offered                      Acceptance and Time Remaining 
 
4.2.2 Probability with Respect to Time Remaining 
 When the bookings open say 30 days before departure, there is very little rush to 
buy and hence the probability of acceptance is also very low. However as the date of 
departure approaches, more customers especially business travelers tend to buy tickets at 
whatever price. Hence the probability of acceptance is greater towards the end. The 
equation we have used here is, 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Time Remaining)*m                                    (5) 
This equation follows the initial as well as the final conditions of 100% and 50% 
probability of acceptance. The graph of time remaining and probability is linear and is 
shown in Fig. 5. 
 
4.2.3 Composite Probability 
 Both the probability approaches mentioned above are correct in their individual 
capacity. However consider the case when the bookings are just opened and at the same 
time the lowest fares are offered by the airline. The probability with respect to price 
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would suggest a higher probability of acceptance as the ticket price is the lowest; where 
as the probability with respect to time would suggest a lower probability of acceptance as 
it is too early in the booking period and the customer is in no particular hurry to book. 
Hence the need for a composite probability approach that models the customer behavior 
on the basis of price offered and time remaining. Here we have used the equation 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered –Cheapest Price)*l – (Time           
                                                        Remaining)*m               (6)     
This equation satisfies the initial conditions of higher probability when price offered is 
the cheapest and Time Remaining is 30 days and vice versa. 
l and m are the respective normalizing constants. 
 
4.3 Customer Arrival Rate 
 The booking process is assumed to start 30 days in advance and this 30 day period 
is divided in to 6 time slots of 5 days each. Three different customer arrival rates of low, 
medium and high have been used and the customers arrive according to non-stationary 
Poisson process. 
 
4.4 Simulation as a Tool 
 There have been several models based on mathematical programming techniques 
to tackle the airline revenue management problem. However, these models are based on 
many simplifying assumptions such as pre-determined prices, no batch/multiple seat 
bookings, fixed number of seats assigned to each fare class, lower fare class requests 
arrive before higher fare class requests, etc. which are not realistic. In spite of these 
assumptions the models are quite complex to build, understand and solve. The strategies 
and policies developed earlier in this chapter are tested using computer simulation models 
in this research. The reason for using simulation is that it allows the models to represent 
the real world system faithfully. However, the results are based on statistical foundations. 
Therefore, while using simulation models one needs to verify and validate them. Also, 
the statistical issues should be resolved properly in order for the results to be valid and 
meaningful. 
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4.5 Model Development 
 Using equations (1) through (6), we consider the development of a single leg 
airline revenue management model. Based on the outcome of this model, we develop a 
network revenue management model of three cities. Booking period in all the models 
starts 30 days in advance. Customers arrive according to Poisson process, which has a 
rate that varies with respect to time (non-stationary Poisson process). The number of seats 
on the aircraft is fixed. 
 A range of fares with an upper limit equal to the maximum price offered and 
lower limit equal to the minimum price offered is set by the airline. Each arriving 
customer is offered a ticket price by the airline booking system according to the pricing 
structure i.e., according to the time remaining, seats remaining and hybrid approach. It is 
up to the customer to decide whether to accept or reject the offered ticket price. This is 
called acceptance probability. Also this decision is a two way by chance probability. If 
the customer rejects the offer, he exits the booking system.  
If the customer accepts the offer price, a seat is reserved for him/her and the total 
number of seats available for sale is reduced by one. The ticket price offered and the total 
revenue generated at this stage is recorded. Our objective in this model is to maximize 
revenue within the above-mentioned boundaries and conditions. 
 Here we are considering nine different models depending on the pricing structure 
(seats remaining, time remaining and hybrid approach) and customer behavior 
(probability with regards to price and time as well as hybrid probability) and their 
combinations. Also depending on the probability of accepting a ticket, an approximation 
of the type of destination served by the flight such as a tourist destination, business 
destination or a mix of both can be obtained. Hence the model combinations could be as 
shown in Table1. 
 In this chapter we have presented the strategies for ticket pricing and probability 
of accepting the price offered for different types of customers.  The corresponding 
equations were formulated as well. The numerical analyses of these strategies and their 
results are presented in the next chapter. 
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Table 1 Model Combinations  
Model Type Pricing Strategy based on Type of Destination 
Seats Rem. & Price Prob. Seats Remaining 
Time Rem & Price Prob. Time Remaining 
Hybrid Price & Price Prob. Time and Seats Remaining 
 
Mainly Tourist Destination 
(e.g. Las Vegas) 
Seats Rem & Time Prob Seats Remaining 
Time Rem & Time Prob Time Remaining 
Hybrid Price & Time Prob. Time and Seats Remaining 
 
Mainly Business 
Destination (e.g. Detroit) 
Seats Rem. &Hybrid Prob. Seats Remaining 
Time Rem & Hybrid Prob. Time Remaining 
Hybrid Price & Hybrid Prob Time and Seats Remaining 
 
Could be a mix of both (e.g. 
New York) 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
 In this chapter the policies and strategies as discussed in the previous section are 
tested using simulation models and their results are presented. Also an analysis of 
variance is performed. 
  
5.1 Single Leg Models  
In this section we have considered nine different models with their assumptions 
and necessary details and have compared their results. For this flight leg, a flight capacity 
of 200 passengers is assumed. The minimum price offered by the airline is $125 per 
ticket whereas the maximum is $400. The booking of this flight leg starts 30 days in 
advance. A fare offered is for the first part of the round trip and only the forward part of 
the journey is modeled. The return part can be modeled in a similar fashion. The time 
duration of 30 days is divided in to 6 time slots of 5 days each. The customer arrivals are 
assumed to follow Poisson distribution with arrival rates that vary with respect to time. 
Three different arrival rates have been used. The terminating condition for this model 
could be either when all the seats are sold out or when the end of the booking period is 
reached.  
 
5.1.1 Normalizing Constants 
In this section we describe how we have calculated the values of the normalizing 
constants j, k, l and m. 
 
5.1.1.1 Time Remaining Approach 
Price Offered = Pmax – (Time Remaining) * j 
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Initially when we open the bookings, the time remaining is 30 days and price offered is 
the cheapest price. Hence,  
125 = 400 – (30)*j  
which gives us a value of  j = 9.167 
 
5.1.1.2 Seats Remaining Approach 
Price Offered =  Pmax – (Seats Remaining) * k 
Initially when the booking is opened the entire seat inventory is available and hence, the 
cheapest fare is offered. Therefore, 
125 = 400 – (200)*k 
which gives us k = 1.375 
 
5.1.1.3 Hybrid Approach 
Price Offered = Pmax  - (Time Remaining) * j – (Seats Remaining) * k 
The total price differential between the minimum and the maximum price offered is  
(400-125) = 275, the time remaining is 30 days and seats are 200.  
Case 1. Balanced Weights. If we decide to assign equal weight to both the time remaining 
and seats remaining then we have  
 275*0.5 = 30j which gives a value of j = 4.58. Also 
 275*0.5 = 200k which gives a value of k = 0.6875. 
Case 2. Weighted towards Seats Remaining. Suppose we decide to assign 20% weight to 
the time remaining and the remaining 80% weight to the seats remaining, we have 
 275*0.2 = 30j which gives j = 1.8333 and 
 275*0.8 = 200k which gives k = 1.1 
Case 3. Weighted towards Time Remaining. Instead, if 80 % weight is attached to the 
time remaining and 20 % to seats remaining, then 
 275*0.8 = 30j   or,  j = 7.3333 
 275*0.2 = 200k  or, k = 0.275 
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 5.1.1.4 Probability of Acceptance with Respect to Price Offered 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered –Cheapest Price)*l 
The probability of acceptance is set to range between a high level of 100% and a low 
level of 50%. When price offered is the highest probability of acceptance is the lowest. 
This gives us, 
 50 = 100 – (400-125)*l or, l = 0.1818. 
 
5.1.1.5 Probability of Acceptance with Respect to Time Remaining 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Time Remaining)*m 
If the time remaining is 30 days then the probability of accepting a ticket is on the lower 
side considering all the time the customer has to choose a flight. Therefore we have, 
50 = 100 – (30)*m     or, m = 1.6667 
 
5.1.1.6 Composite Probability 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered – Cheapest Price)*l – (Time    
                        Remaining)*m  
The probability of acceptance is set at two levels 100 % and 50 % and their differential is 
50. The price offered differential is 275 and time remaining is 30 days. Thus, 
Case1. Balanced Weights. The probability of acceptance depending up on the price 
offered and time remaining is given equal weight. This is an example of a mixed type of 
market where the demand by tourists as well as business travelers is equal (e.g. New 
York). 
 50*0.5 = 275l   or, l = 0.0909 
 50*0.5 = 30m   or, m = 0.83 
Case2. Weighted Towards Price Offered. Here the price offered is given 80 % weight and 
time remaining is given 20 % weight. This is an example of a tourist driven market where 
majority of the passengers are price conscious tourists (e.g. Las Vegas). 
 50*0.8 = 275l which gives l = 0.1454  
50*0.2 = 30m   or, m = 0.3333 
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Table 2 Table of Normalizing Constants and Their Values 
 
Equation Criterion Normalizing Constant 
Price Offered = Pmax – (Time Remaining) * j Time 
Remaining 
j = 9.167 
Price Offered =  Pmax – (Seats Remaining) * k Seats 
Remaining 
k= 1.375 
Price Offered = Pmax  - (Time Remaining) * j – 
(Seats Remaining) * k 
Time and 
Seats 
Remaining 
j = 4.58     & k = 0.6875 (Equal Weights)  
j = 1.8333 & k = 1.1 (Weighted Towards Seats) 
j = 7.3333 & k = 0.275 (Weighted Towards Time) 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price 
Offered –Cheapest Price)*l 
Price Offered l = 0.1818 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Time 
Remaining)*m 
Time 
Remaining 
m = 1.6667 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price 
Offered - Cheapest Price)*l – (Time 
Remaining)*m 
 
Price Offered 
and Time 
Remaining 
l = 0.0909 & m = 0.83 (Equal Weights) 
l = 0.1454 & m = 0.3333 (Weighted Towards Price) 
l = 0.0363 & m = 1.3333 (Weighted Towards Time) 
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Case3. Weighted Towards Time Remaining. The time to depart is given more weight 
(80%) and price offered is given 20 % weight. This example could represent a market 
where majority of customers are business travelers (e.g. Detroit).  
 50*0.2 = 275l   or, l = 0.0363 
 50*0.8 = 30m   or, m = 1.3333 
The different policies we discussed so far and their corresponding normalizing constants 
have been stated in Table 2. 
 
5.1.2 Arrival Rate 
 The customer arrivals follow a non-stationary Poisson arrival process with three 
different arrival rates of low, medium and high. The booking period of 30 days is divided 
in to 6 time slots of 5 days each and each time slot having a different arrival rate. A low 
arrival rate can be 0.16, 0.25, 0.33, 0.41, 0.25, 0.33 per hour which corresponds to 4, 6, 8, 
10, 6, 8 customers per day. A medium arrival rate can be 0.20, 0.30, 0.35, 0.45, 0.38, 0.33 
which corresponds to 5, 7, 8, 11, 9, 8 customers per day. A high arrival rate is 0.35, 0.40, 
0.45, 0.48, 0.30, and 0.35 which is 8, 9, 10, 11, 7 and 8 arrivals per day. The arrival rates 
can be summarized from the following table. 
 
Table 3 Arrival Rates 
 
Arrival Rate(Number of customers per day for every 5 days) 
 
Type 0-5 
days 
5-10 
days 
10-15 
days 
15-20 
days 
20-25 
days 
25-30 
days 
Total 
Customers 
Low 4 6 8 10 6 8 210 
Medium 5 7 8 11 9 8 240 
High 8 9 10 11 7 8 265 
 
 The arrival rates are also calculated in terms of number of customers per hour as 
Arena software is unable to accept the arrival rate in terms of customers per day. If the 
number of customers per day is 6, then 6/24 = 0.25 would be the arrival rate per hour.  
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Table 4 Comparison of Single Leg Models for Low Arrival Rate 
 
 
 
Model Type 
 
Customer 
Arrivals 
 
Tickets 
Purchased 
Customers 
balked 
(high price) 
Customers 
lost due to 
no seats 
 
Seats 
Vacant 
Average 
Revenue 
($) 
Half 
Width** 
($) 
Avg. 
Ticket 
Price($) 
Time 
Seats get 
Full* 
 
Type of 
Destination 
Seats Rem & 
Price Prob 
207 162 44 0 37 38,274 570 235 n/a 
Time Rem & 
Price Prob 
207 151 56 0 49 39,431 585 261 n/a 
Hybrid Price 
& Price Prob 
207 157 49 0 43 38,915 575 247 n/a 
Mainly 
tourist 
destination 
e.g. Las 
Vegas 
Seats Rem & 
Time Prob 
207 160 46 0 40 37,685 754 234 n/a 
Time Rem & 
Time Prob 
207 160 46 0 40 46,086 668 287 n/a 
Hybrid Price 
& Time Prob 
207 160 46 0 40 39,343 732 245 n/a 
Mainly 
business 
destination 
e.g. Detroit 
Seats Rem & 
Hybrid Prob 
207 162 45 0 38 38,203 723 235 n/a 
Time Rem & 
Hybrid Prob 
207 153 54 0 47 40,802 598 267 n/a 
Hybrid Price 
& Hybrid 
207 159 47 0 41 43,511 636 273 n/a 
Could be a 
mix of both 
e.g. New 
York 
*days into the booking period **based on 95% Confidence Interval 
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Table 5 Comparison of Single Leg Models for Medium Arrival Rate 
 
 
 
Model Type 
 
Customer 
Arrivals 
 
Tickets 
Purchased 
Customers 
balked (high 
price) 
Customers 
lost due to 
no seats 
 
Seats 
Vacant 
Average 
Revenue 
($) 
Half 
Width** 
($) 
Avg. 
Ticket 
Price($) 
Time 
Seats get 
Full* 
Type of 
Destination 
Seats Rem & 
Price Prob 
241 182 59 0 18 45,396 633 249 n/a 
Time Rem & 
Price Prob 
241 177 64 0 23 46,116 624 261 n/a 
Hybrid Price 
& Price Prob 
241 180 61 0 20 45,778 616 254 n/a 
Mainly 
tourist 
destination 
e.g. Las 
Vegas 
Seats Rem & 
Time Prob 
243 188 54 0 12 47,731 808 253 n/a 
Time Rem & 
Time Prob 
241 186 54 0 14 53,328 677 286 n/a 
Hybrid Price 
& Time Prob 
241 186 54 0 14 48,301 786 259 n/a 
Mainly 
business 
destination 
e.g. Detroit 
Seats Rem & 
Hybrid Prob 
243 189 54 0 11 47,954 752 254 n/a 
Time Rem & 
Hybrid Prob 
241 182 59 0 18 49,852 649 274 n/a 
Hybrid Price 
& Hybrid 
241 185 55 0 15 51,104 669 275 n/a 
Could be a 
mix of both 
e.g. New 
York 
*days into the booking period **based on 95% Confidence Interval   
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Table 6 Comparison of Single Leg Models for High Arrival Rate 
 
 
 
Model Type 
 
Customer 
Arrivals 
 
Tickets 
Purchased 
Customers 
balked 
(high price) 
Customers 
lost due to 
no seats 
 
Seats 
Vacant 
Average 
Revenue 
($) 
Half 
Width** 
($) 
Avg. 
Ticket 
Price($) 
Time 
Seats get 
Full* 
Type of 
Destination 
Seats Rem & 
Price Prob 
279 197 73 9 0 51,285 370 259 17 
Time Rem & 
Price Prob 
280 199 56 24 0 47,255 310 237 23 
Hybrid Price 
& Price Prob 
280 198 66 16 0 49,603 275 250 20 
Mainly 
tourist 
destination 
e.g. Las 
Vegas 
Seats Rem & 
Time Prob 
279 198 69 12 0 51,569 354 260 22 
Time Rem & 
Time Prob 
279 198 69 12 0 52,986 303 267 21 
Hybrid Price 
& Time Prob 
279 198 69 12 0 51,853 317 261 21 
Mainly 
business 
destination 
e.g. Detroit 
Seats Rem & 
Hybrid Prob 
280 198 70 0 2 51,532 341 260 n/a 
Time Rem & 
Hybrid Prob 
280 198 64 0 2 49,998 313 252 n/a 
Hybrid Price 
& Hybrid 
280 198 68 0 2 51,808 289 261 n/a 
Could be a 
mix of both 
e.g. New 
York 
*days into the booking period **based on 95% Confidence Interval 
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5.2 Results and Analysis 
Using the above values of j, k, l and m, the nine models are run for a replication 
length of 30 days and 100 replications each for low, medium and high arrival rates. The 
number of replications have been calculated to obtain a half width of less than 2% of the 
revenue generated and has been explained in Appendix B. The results are shown in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively and are average for 100 replications. The first column 
indicates the model type as explained in detail in Table 1 and the last column gives the 
exact time in to the booking period when the seats get full. 
Tourists are mostly price conscious people and hence tend to book their flights 
well in advance. Hence their acceptance probability of a ticket would be mostly based on 
price. From Table 4 we observe that for the tourist destination any of the three models 
could be used as the average revenue generated is pretty much the same. The half widths 
of all the three revenue generated values overlap and hence, there is no significant 
difference between the three values. Since average ticket price is the least for Seats Rem 
& Price Prob model, this could be the optimal strategy. Also out of the three models the 
Seats Rem & Price Prob model sells the most seats.    
Business travelers generally tend to book late in the booking period and price is 
not really the deciding factor for them. Hence their acceptance probability of a ticket 
would be mostly based on time. From Table 4 we observe that for the business 
destination, the revenue generated by all the three models is significantly different as 
their half widths do not overlap. Time Rem and Time Prob generates the most revenue as 
price is charged according to time remaining and business customers tend to book late 
when the price is higher. Also average ticket price is the most for this model. Hybrid 
Price & Time Prob model generates the second most revenue and Seats Rem & Time 
Prob the least revenue. Numbers of seats remaining vacant are the same in all the models.  
For a mixed type of destination which would have both tourist and business 
travelers, the probability of acceptance would be based on both time and price offered. 
The revenue generated by Seats Rem & Hybrid Prob and Time Rem & Hybrid Prob is not 
significantly different as their half widths overlap. But the revenue generated by Hybrid 
Price and Hybrid Prob is significantly different from the other two models. This model 
generates the most revenue as price offered is according to both time and seats remaining 
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and both types of customers, tourists and business book on this flight. Also the average 
ticket price is not very high and hence, this could be the optimal policy. Time Rem & 
Hybrid Prob generates the second most revenue. Average ticket price is the slightly less 
for Time Rem & Hybrid Prob, but since less customers book this flight average revenue 
generated is less. The most number of customers purchasing tickets is in the Seats Rem & 
Hybrid Prob model, but as the average ticket price is least the revenue generated is also 
the least.      
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Table 5 and 6 with the only exception that 
for the high arrival rate, the Seats Rem. and Price Prob. generates the most revenue for 
the tourist destination. This could be attributed to the high rate of arrival which fills up 
the seats faster when the ticket price is low. All these results have been summarized 
according to the arrival rate and destination type in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 Best Pricing Strategy 
 
Destination Type Arrival Rate 
Tourist Business Mixed 
Low Seats Rem & Price 
Prob 
Time Rem & Time 
Prob 
Hybrid Price & 
Hybrid Prob 
Medium Seats Rem & Price 
Prob 
Time Rem & Time 
Prob 
Hybrid Price & 
Hybrid Prob 
High Seats Rem. & Price 
Prob 
Time Rem & Time 
Prob 
Hybrid Price & 
Hybrid Prob 
 
 
5.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis  
To test the sensitivity of the results obtained from our model we have taken a 
second example and verified if the results and conclusions drawn are consistent with the 
original example. In this second example we have assumed a flight capacity of 300 
passengers with the lower price limit being set at $200 and the higher limit at $425. The 
booking period was kept at 30 days and two arrival rates (low and medium) were 
adjusted corresponding to the increase in flight capacity. The adjusted low arrival rate 
gives 0.35, 0.45, 0.53, 0.50, 0.38 and 0.43 customers per hour or 8, 11, 13, 12, 9 and 10 
customers per day. The adjusted medium arrival rate gives 0.38, 0.45, 0.50, 0.63, 0.55 
and 0.50 customers per hour or 9, 11, 12, 15, 13 and 12 customers per day. All the nine 
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models were run for 100 replications for the adjusted low and medium rate of arrivals. 
The revenues generated by the hybrid probability models were used for verifying the 
sensitivity of the results. The revenue generated by the original example and this second 
example are shown in Table 8 and 9. 
 
Table 8 Revenues for Low and Adjusted Low Rate of Arrival 
Model Type Revenue Generated by Original Example ($) 
Revenue Generated by 
Second Example ($) 
Seats Remaining & Hybrid 
Probability 
38,203 (13.8%)* 60,866(8.8%)* 
Time Remaining & Hybrid 
Probability 
40,802 (6.6)* 62,326(6.3%)* 
Hybrid Price & Hybrid 
Probability 43,511  66,267 
*proportion by which this revenue is less than the maximum revenue 
 
Table 9 Revenues for Medium and Adjusted Medium Rate of Arrival 
Model Type Revenue Generated by Original Example ($) 
Revenue Generated by 
Second Example ($) 
Seats Remaining & Hybrid 
Probability 
47,954(6.5%)* 72,228(7.2%)* 
Time Remaining & Hybrid 
Probability 
49,852(2.5%)* 74,940(3.3%)* 
Hybrid Price & Hybrid 
Probability 
51,104 77,465 
*proportion by which this revenue is less than the maximum revenue 
 
From Table 8 it can be observed that the hybrid price policy generates the most 
revenue followed by the time remaining model. The seats remaining model generates the 
least revenue for both the examples. The percentage loss in the revenue compared with 
the best policy is given in parentheses for both the examples.  It can be seen that the 
relative performance of all the policies in the second example is consistent with that of 
original problem. Similar observations can be drawn from Table 9. The outcome of the 
second example reinforces our belief that the strategies that have been modeled are robust 
with regard to assumptions that have been made regarding ticket pricing, plane capacity 
and arrival population.  
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5.2.1 Analysis of Variance 
In order to compare the results produced by different simulations runs and to find 
out the impact the parameters that are varied (controls) have on the results (response) we 
perform analysis of variance also called ANOVA. The hybrid price and hybrid 
probability model is considered as a sample example. We believe that there are two 
factors that if varied will give significant changes in the revenue generated. These two 
factors are the price offered and probability of acceptance. The price offered and 
probability of acceptance are determined by the following equations, 
 
Price Offered = Pmax  - (Time Remaining) * j – (Seats Remaining) * k 
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered-Cheapest Price)*l – (Time   
                       Remaining)*m   
where j, k, l and m are normalizing constants as shown in Table 2. Another factor we 
believe most certainly has an impact on the revenue generated is the arrival rate and 
hence we intend to conduct an analysis of the significant factors at all three levels of the 
arrival rate. However for the sake of our proposal we have used the low rate of arrival. 
 
Table 10 Controls and Their Levels 
Control Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Pricing Strategy Weighted towards Seats Remaining Balanced Weights 
Weighted towards 
Time Remaining 
Acceptance 
Probability 
Weighted Towards 
Price Offered 
Balanced Weights Weighted Towards 
Time Remaining 
Arrival Rate Low Medium High 
 
The ANOVA for this 2 factorial, 3 level design is performed using Minitab software for 
10 replicates at each level for the low arrival rate. The analysis of variance is as follows. 
 
Multilevel Factorial Design  
 
Factors:      2     Replicates:     10 
Base runs:    9     Total runs:     90 
Base blocks:  1     Total blocks:    1 
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Number of levels: 3, 3 
 
Analysis of Variance for Revenue Generated, using Adjusted 
SS for Tests 
 
Source              DF      Seq SS      Adj SS     Adj MS      F      P 
Pricing Strategy     2   133526695   133526695   66763348   6.69  0.002 
Acceptance Prob.     2  1071964396  1071964396  535982198  53.72  0.000 
Pricing Strategy*AcceptProb    4            25370324              25370324             6342581         0.64        0.638 
Error               81   808115814   808115814    9976738 
Total               89  2038977229 
 
From the above analysis we see that the F values for Pricing Strategy  (6.69) and the  F-
value for Acceptance Probability (53.72) are greater than F0.05, 2, 81 (3.15). Hence we can 
conclude that both Pricing Strategy and Acceptance Probability are significant factors 
and their interaction Pricing Strategy*Acceptance Probability is not significant as its F 
value (0.64) is less than 3.15. The ANOVA for the medium and high arrival rates also 
indicate similar results. They have been attached in the Appendix portion of this 
document. From Table 3 we can observe that the time remaining and probability based on 
time strategy generates the most revenue ($46,086). However, in all models other than 
the hybrid model either the pricing strategy or acceptance probability can be adjusted but 
not both. In the sample hybrid model which we have used for the purpose of calculations, 
high revenue of $52,755 can be obtained by setting the pricing strategy and acceptance 
probability at level 3 as shown in Table 10. This is done using the Process Analyzer part 
of the Arena simulation software. Hence the hybrid price and hybrid probability model 
out performs all the other models in terms of revenue generated. 
Other strategies where the probability of acceptance is based on the price offered 
are more or less meant for the price conscious leisure travelers (tourists) who tend to 
book their tickets much in advance when the price offered is the lowest where as the 
strategies where the probability of acceptance is based on time are applicable to the 
business travelers who don’t mind paying a high fare as long as they get to their 
destination at the right time. Such customers usually tend to book their tickets late in the 
booking period. The hybrid price and hybrid probability strategy covers the scenarios 
mentioned above into one model. 
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In the next chapter we will develop some new strategies for a network of three 
cities with direct and stop-over flights and suggest the optimal strategy to be used.      
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CHAPTER 6 
NETWORK MODELS 
 
This chapter discusses the main factors used in the development of the network 
model of three cities. The main factors to be considered here are the pricing of all the 
flight legs, their acceptance probability and also different arrival patterns of customers. 
 
6.1 Flight Network 
A network of three cities is considered as shown in Figure 6. There are four 
origin-destinations, Tampa-Atlanta (1-2), Atlanta-New York (2-3) and Tampa-New York 
(1-3) and Tampa-Atlanta-New York (1-2-3). Their assumed flight capacities and price 
ranges are shown in Table 11. 
                                 3    New York 
 
      Table 11 Flight Capacities and Price Ranges  
    
Atlanta 
       2 
 
 
      1 Tampa 
Figure 6 Flight Network 
  
6.2 Pricing Strategy 
The pricing strategy for the individual flight legs 1-2 and 2-3 will remain the same 
as in the single leg approach as these customers are flying only on these single legs and 
do not have a connecting flight. Hence the pricing for these flight legs will be dependent 
upon the time remaining, seats remaining and their combination. As observed in Chapter 
Origin-Destination Flight Capacity Min Price Max Price 
1-2 200 100 275 
2-3 125 100 225 
1-3 150 150 350 
1-2-3           125 100 300 
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5 there could be nine different combination equations for each flight leg and here we 
have used only the hybrid combinations as it was found that the combination of time and 
seats remaining model gives the maximum revenue. These have been summarized in 
Table 10. 
However for a customer flying from Tampa to New York can either book on the 
direct flight (1-3) or the connecting flight with a stop over in Atlanta (1-2-3). Hence the 
problem comes down to pricing the origin-destinations 1-3 and 1-2-3. 
 
6.2.1 Pricing Strategy for Tampa New York (1-3) Direct Flight 
 The pricing for Tampa New York direct flight (1-3) is assumed to be independent 
of the seats remaining on the indirect route (1-2-3). Here we have assumed flight leg 1-3 
to be independent and hence the price offered for 1-3 would be similar to the single flight 
legs 1-2 and 2-3. It can be either dependent on time remaining, seats remaining or their 
combination. Here also we have used the hybrid equations and these have been 
summarized in Table 12.  
 
6.2.2 Pricing Strategy for Tampa New York (1-2-3) Indirect Flight 
 The indirect flight 1-2-3 is offered to generate extra revenue from the vacant seats 
on flight legs 1-2 and 2-3. But at the same time it has to be made sure that this flight does 
not diminish the revenue generated by the direct flight. Thus, the price offered for the 
indirect flight has to be dependent on the seats available for that flight leg, seats 
remaining on the direct flight and the price offered for the direct flight. Two strategies 
have been used.  
Strategy1. In the first strategy the price offered when the booking begins is the cheapest 
and there after increases as the seats remaining on the direct flight decrease. The equation 
developed for this approach is, 
Price Offered123 = Price Offered13 – (Seats Remaining 123)*j - (150 - Seats    
        Remaining13)*k                                                                       (7) 
Initially, when the booking starts we have 
 100 = 150 – (125)*j - (150 – 150)*k 
Which gives us j = 0.4  
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Towards the end of the booking process, 
 Price Offered123 = 350 – (1)*j - (150 – 1)*k  
  300 = 350 - 0.4 - 149*k which gives us k = 0.3328 
Strategy2. It was observed from the websites of some popular airlines that when the 
bookings were opened the indirect flight was priced much higher than the direct flight. 
The explanation for this strategy could be that the airline wants to sell the seats on the 
direct flight first and then the remaining demand is absorbed of by the indirect flight.    
Hence, the price offered for the indirect flight when the booking is opened is the highest 
and the ticket price decreases as the booking period advances. The equation developed 
for this approach is 
Price Offered123 = Price Offered13 – (Seats Remaining 123)*j - (50 - Seats    
        Remaining13)*k                                                                       (8) 
Initially, the booking starts and all the seats are available, the cheapest price will be 
offered for 1-3 and price offered for 1-2-3 will be max. Thus, 
 300 = 150 – 125*j – (50 - 150)*k which is 
 100k – 125j = 150 
Also towards the end the following condition could prevail, 
 100 = 350 – 1*j – (50 – 1)*k which is 
 49k + j = 250  
Equating the above two equations we can solve for j and k. 
j = 2.8353 and k = 5.0441   
 
6.3 Acceptance Probability Strategy 
 Acceptance probability equations for the individual flight legs 1-2 and 2-3 will 
remain the same as in the single leg approach as these customers are flying only on these 
single legs and do not have a connecting flight. These are dependent on the time 
remaining to depart, price offered or their combination. Here we have used only their 
hybrid combination and it has been stated in Table 13. A customer flying from Tampa to 
New York can either book on the direct flight (1-3) or the connecting flight with a stop 
over in Atlanta (1-2-3). Hence the question is whether to accept itinerary 1-3 or 1-2-3 or 
not to accept the fare at all. The acceptance probability cannot be based on time as both  
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Table 12 Normalizing Constants for Pricing Strategy 
Flight Leg Equation Criterion Normalizing Constant 
1-2 Price Offered12 = Pmax12  - (Time Remaining) * j 
– (Seats Remaining12) * k 
Time and 
Seats 
Remaining 
j = 2.9166  & k = 0.4375 (Equal Weights)  
 
2-3 Price Offered23 = Pmax23  - (Time Remaining) * j 
– (Seats Remaining23) * k 
Time and 
Seats 
Remaining 
j = 2.0833  & k = 0.5 (Equal Weights)  
 
1-3 Price Offered13 = Pmax13 – (Time Remaining)*j- 
(Seats Remaining 1 3)*k 
Time and 
Seats 
Remaining 
j = 3.3333  & k = 0.6666 (Equal Weights)  
 
 
 
Table 13 Normalizing Constants for Acceptance Strategy 
Flight Leg Equation Criterion Normalizing Constant 
1-2 Probability of Acceptance12 = 100 – (Price 
Offered12 - Cheapest Price12)*l – (Time 
Remaining)*m 
Price Offered and Time 
Remaining 
l = 0.14 & m = 0.83 (Equal Weights) 
2-3 
Probability of Acceptance23 = 100 – (Price 
Offered23 - Cheapest Price)*l – (Time 
Remaining)*m 
 
Price Offered and Time 
Remaining l = 0.2 & m = 0.83 (Equal Weights) 
 
 41 
flights are assumed to depart at the same point in time. Hence the only deciding factors 
are the price differential between the direct and stop-over flight and the inability to buy 
even the cheapest fare offered for the Tampa New York. 
 
6.3.1 Probability of Not Buying 
As mentioned before the customer will decide not to fly Tampa New York (1-3 or 
1-2-3) if he is not able to even purchase the lowest offered fare which could be either 1-3 
or 1-2-3. Hence two equations are used to determine whether the customer will accept the 
fare. 
Case 1. Acceptance Probability if the lower price offered is 1-3 
Probability of AcceptanceT-NY = 100 – (Price Offered13 –Cheapest Price13)*l (9) 
If price offered is maximum, acceptance probability is lower. Hence, 
 50 = 100 – (350 – 150)*l 
Which gives l = 0.25 
Case 2. Acceptance Probability if the lower price offered is 1-2-3 
 Probability of AcceptanceT-NY = 100 – (Price Offered123 –Cheapest Price123)*m 
                                                                                                                                         (10)                             
Similar to Case1, we have 
 50 = 100-(300 – 100)*m and m = 0.25  
  
6.3.2 Price Differential 
 If the price difference between the direct and the indirect route is $50 or less than 
$50, it is assumed that the customer would rather fly direct route than the stop-over route. 
However there would still be some passengers who would want to save that $50 and we 
have assumed them to be 10% of this population. 
 If the price differential is $150 or greater than $150, it is assumed the customers 
would rather fly the stop-over route and save some money. However there would still be 
some passengers who would want to fly directly and we have assumed them to be 10% of 
this population. 
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 If the price differential is between $50 and $150 then the acceptance probability 
equation is  
Probability of Acceptance = 10 + (Price Differential – 50)*0.8                        (11) 
This equation suggests that lower the differential, lower is the probability of flying the 
indirect route and higher the differential, higher is the probability of flying the indirect 
route. 
 
6.4 Arrival Distribution 
The customer arrivals are assumed to follow Poisson distribution with arrival 
rates that vary with respect to time and different arrival rates have been used for each 
origin-destination. As in the single leg models the booking period of 30 days is divided in 
to 6 time slots of 5 days each and each time slot having a different arrival rate.  
Three different arrival patterns have been experimented with. The first pattern 
shows a mixed type of market with both tourist and business concentration. The second 
pattern signifies a business market with customers not really price conscious and booking 
towards the end of the booking period. This is shown by an increase in the customer 
arrival rate towards the end of the booking process. The third pattern shows a tourist 
market where the customer arrivals are concentrated towards the beginning of the 
booking process as price conscious tourists generally tend to book at the start. The three 
different arrival patterns for on flight leg (1-2) are shown in Figures 7 and the arrival 
rates are shown in Table 14.  
 
6.5 Model Development 
 The booking of all flight legs is assumed to start 30 days in advance and all flights 
depart at the same point in time. The fares offered are for the first part of the round trip 
and only the forward part of the journey is modeled and return part can be modeled in 
similar way. The pricing and acceptance of fares on flight legs 1-2 and 2-3 follows the 
same assumptions and parameters used in the single leg approach. The hybrid price and 
hybrid probability strategies have been used. Now when a customer for the Tampa-New 
York itinerary enters the booking process, two separate fares namely 1-3 and 1-2-3 are 
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offered to him. If the customer cannot afford even the minimum of the two offered fares 
he leaves the system. If the customer can afford to purchase either of the fares, then the 
question is whether he will fly the direct or the indirect route. If the price differential 
between the direct and the indirect fares is less than or equal to $50, he is assumed to buy 
the direct flight fare (1-3). However there will be some passengers who would still fly the 
indirect route (1-2-3) and we have assumed them to be 10% of this population. If the 
price differential is $150 or more than $150, the customer is assumed to fly the indirect 
route. And there will be some passengers (10%) who would want to avoid the indirect 
route and still fly directly. If the price differential is between $50 and $150, the lower the 
differential, lower is the probability of flying the indirect route and higher the differential, 
higher is the probability of flying the indirect route.   
 
6.5.1 Blocking of Seats in 1-2-3 
 In this model we have also attempted to exclusively sell the seats on the direct 
route (1-3) when the booking process starts, by blocking the seats on the indirect route (1-
2-3) till a certain number of seats on the direct route are sold and then opening up the 
seats to be sold on the indirect route. This exclusive reservation of seats on the direct 
route is done for 50% (75 seats), 33% (50 seats), 16% (25 seats) and zero seats out of the 
total flight capacity of 150 seats. The models developed have been run for a replication 
length of 30 days and 200 replications each for the three different arrival patterns and 
using both the pricing strategies for Price Offered 123. By setting the number of 
replications at 168, the half width for the total revenue generated is less than 1% of its 
value. The method for calculating the number of replications is shown in Appendix B. 
The results are shown in Table 15, 16 and 17.  
 
6.6 Results and Analysis 
In Table 12, the first column indicates the percentage of seats initially reserved for 
the direct flight 1-3. This implies that the indirect flight between the destinations (1-2 and 
2-3 in our example) will not be opened until certain percentage of direct flight seats is 
sold. The model was run with 50% (75 seats), 33% (50 seats) and 16% (25 seats) of the 
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Table 14 Arrival Rates and Pattern 
Arrival Rate (Number of customers per day for every 5 days) 
Itinerary 
Arrival Pattern 1 Arrival Pattern 2 Arrival Pattern 3 
Total No of 
Customers 
Total Flight 
Capacity 
Tampa-Atlanta 4, 6, 8, 10, 6, 8 4, 6, 6, 8, 8, 10 10, 8, 8, 6, 6, 4 213 200 
Atlanta-New York 2, 5, 7, 8, 6, 4 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 2 155 125 
Tampa-New York 5, 7, 8, 11, 9, 8 5, 7, 8, 8, 9, 11 11, 9, 8, 8, 7, 5 232 150 
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Table 15 Results for Arrival Pattern 1 
 
* half width 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 % Seats 
Reserved 
for 1-3 
Flight
Leg 
Revenue 
Generated 
Average 
Ticket Pr 
Seats 
Vacant 
Customer 
Balked 
Flight
Leg 
Revenue 
Generated 
Average 
Ticket Pr 
Seats 
Vacant 
Customers 
Balked 
1-2 $23,560    $179 48 76 1-2 $23,738    $180 35 77 
2-3 14,013 158 16 67 2-3 13,675 157 5 67 
1-3 30,611 243 24 1-3 26,989 236 36 
1-2-3 4,533 230 16 
95 
1-2-3 6,753 208 5 
94 
50 
(75 seats) 
Total 72,719         (829)* -  Total 71,157          (775)* - - 
1-2 23,643 180 45 77 1-2 23,886 182 29 77 
2-3 13,967 159 13 68 2-3 13,289 158 1 67 
1-3 31,835 245 20 1-3 27,692 238 13 
1-2-3 5,161 216 13 
88 
1-2-3 8,805 226 1 
86 
33 
(50 seats) 
Total 74,608         (826)* - - Total 73,674          (764)* - - 
1-2 23,576 182 41 76 1-2 23,506 182 29 76 
2-3 14,093 162 8 69 2-3 13,077 158 0 64 
1-3 33,437 247 15 1-3 29,614 240 27 
1-2-3 5,784 197 8 
78 
1-2-3 9,391 222 0 
76 
16 
(25 seats) 
Total 76,892         (782)* - - Total 75,589          (701)* - - 
1-2 24,102 185 35 77 1-2 23,957 185 23 78 
2-3 14,076 164 4 69 2-3 12,218 158 0 63 
1-3 34,689 247 9 1-3 31,336 240 20 
1-2-3 6,327 181 4 
64 
1-2-3 10,406 217 0 
63 
0 
Total 79,196         (739)* - - Total 77,920          (684)* - - 
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Table 16 Results for Arrival Pattern 2 
 
 
* half width 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 % Seats 
Reserved 
for 1-3 
Flight
Leg 
Revenue 
Generated 
Average 
Ticket Pr 
Seats 
Vacant 
Customer 
Balked 
Flight
Leg 
Revenue 
Generated 
Average 
Ticket Pr 
Seats 
Vacant 
Customers 
Balked 
1-2 $24,071    $182 47 77 1-2 $23,977    $182 38 77 
2-3 14,757 163 13 67 2-3 14,457 162 6 66 
1-3 30,433 245 25 1-3 27,784 239 34 
1-2-3 4,792 229 13 
95 
1-2-3 5,813 195 6 
95 
50 
(75 
seats) 
Total 74,054  (858)* - - Total 71,995  (785)* - - 
1-2 24,356 184 42 77 1-2 24,435 185 28 77 
2-3 14,470 165 11 68 2-3 13,673 163 1 65 
1-3 31,393 247 23 1-3 27,447 239 35 
1-2-3 5,436 208 11 
88 
1-2-3 8,850 224 1 
86 
33 
(50 
seats) 
Total 75,656 (821)* - - Total 74,406  (702)* - - 
1-2 24,284 186 38 77 1-2 24,379 187 25 77 
2-3 14,751 168 6 68 2-3 13,166 164 0 63 
1-3 33,006 249 17 1-3 29,160 241 29 
1-2-3 5,940 190 6 
78 
1-2-3 9,717 220 0 
77 
16 
(25 
seats) 
Total 77,982  (802)* - -- Total 76,424  (684)* - - 
1-2 24,491 189 33 78 1-2 24,511 189 20 78 
2-3 14,424 170 2 67 2-3 12,307 164 0 63 
1-3 34,701 249 11 1-3 30,867 241 22 
1-2-3 6,627 177 2 
64 
1-2-3 10,790 216 0 
58 
0 
Total 80,244  (738)* - - Total 78,477  (666)* - - 
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Table 17 Results for Arrival Pattern 3 
 
 
* half width  
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 % Seats 
Reserved 
for 1-3 
 
Flight
Leg 
Revenue 
Generated 
Average 
Ticket Pr 
Seats 
Vacant 
Customer 
Balked 
Flight
Leg 
Revenue 
Generated 
Average 
Ticket Pr 
Seats 
Vacant 
Customers 
Balked 
1-2 $21,381    $167 52 80 1-2 $21,501    $168 38 80 
2-3 13,041 149 17 70 2-3 12,678 149 5 69 
1-3 29,329 233 24 1-3 25,598 225 36 
1-2-3 4,534 224 17 
96 
1-2-3 6,979 205 5 
95 
50 
(75 seats) 
Total 68,286  (811)* - - Total 66,758  (735)* - - 
1-2 21,650 169 47 80 1-2 21,743 170 31 80 
2-3 13,037 151 13 71 2-3 12,318 149 1 68 
1-3 30,578 235 20 1-3 26,423 227 34 
1-2-3 5,201 209 13 
86 
1-2-3 8,819 217 1 
84 
33 
(50 seats) 
Total 70,468  (771)* - - Total 69,305  (675)* - - 
1-2 21,827 171 41 80 1-2 21,977 172 26 80 
2-3 13,001 152 9 71 2-3 11,726 148 0 66 
1-3 32,145 236 14 1-3 28,167 229 27 
1-2-3 5,960 195 9 
73 
1-2-3 9,682 212 0 
72 
16 
(25 seats) 
Total 72,935  (753)* - - Total 71,554  (649)* - - 
1-2 21,841 174 36 81 1-2 22,050 175 22 81 
2-3 12,998 155 3 70 2-3 10,810 148 0 62 
1-3 33,772 236 7 1-3 30,576 231 17 
1-2-3 6,795 178 3 
57 
1-2-3 10,689 205 0 
57 0 
Total 75,407  (651)* - - Total 74,127  (637)* - - 
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seats being reserved. The entire table is divided in to two parts, the results for strategy 1 
and 2 which is nothing but the two equations we have developed for Price Offered 123. 
From Table 15, we see that the revenue generated progressively increases as the 
number of seats reserved for the direct flight goes on decreasing. Reserving seats for the 
direct flight does not increase the revenue and the model with no seats reserved gives the 
maximum revenue. This is true for both the strategies. When the two strategies are 
compared, strategy 1 outperforms strategy 2 in terms of the total revenue generated. 
However this difference in the revenue generated is not significant for arrival patterns 1 
and 3 (Tables 15 and 17 respectively) as the half widths for the average revenue 
generated overlap. But this difference is significant for the arrival pattern 2 as seen from 
Table 16. 
 For strategy 1, the average ticket prices and revenue generated for leg 1-2 and 2-3 
remain constant irrespective of the blocking. The revenue generated for direct and 
indirect flights increases as the number of seats blocked goes on reducing. This could be 
due to the fact that when the most number of seats are blocked (75 seats), the direct flight 
seats get sold out faster as the ticket price is lower initially. Also, when the indirect flight 
bookings are opened, certain number of seats on the direct flight has been sold and the 
direct flight is more costly than the indirect flight. Therefore, there is more demand to 
purchase the indirect flight thereby reducing the revenue generated for the direct flight. 
But as the blocking of seats goes on reducing and as the bookings for direct and indirect 
flight are opened at the same time this direct flight revenue increases.  
 Average ticket price for the indirect flight when more number of seats are blocked 
(75 seats) is higher resulting in less customers buying and hence, lower revenues. But 
when no seats are blocked the average ticket price is much lower resulting in more 
demand and hence more revenue generated. This combined increase in the revenue of 
direct and indirect flight results in a higher total revenue generated when no seats are 
blocked. Similar conclusions can be dram from strategy 2. The best pricing strategy to be 
used for different type of markets can be summarized according to Table 18.  
In this chapter we have seen a flight network of three cities. Pricing strategies and 
customer acceptance strategies for the four origin destinations have been discussed. 
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Further, the sale of the indirect flight seats was blocked until a percentage of the direct 
flight seats were sold. These strategies were tested for the three different patterns of 
arrival. The results suggested the optimal strategy to be followed. In the final conclusion 
chapter of this thesis, we will summarize the entire thesis and discuss the future 
extensions that can be carried out.   
  
Table 18 Best Pricing Strategy for Network Model 
 
Arrival Pattern 
Mixed Business Tourist 
Strategy to be 
followed 
Strategy 1 or 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 1 or 2 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this chapter we will briefly summarize the research undertaken in this thesis 
and also state the scope for future research. 
 
7.1 Summary and Conclusions  
In this research, a very important problem faced by the airline industry namely 
ticket pricing was considered. Different strategies such as pricing strategy, customer 
acceptance probability strategy and factors such as customer arrival rates and arrival 
distribution were considered. Initially the pricing policy for a single flight leg was 
developed. Three different pricing strategies namely time remaining, seats remaining and 
their combination were developed. Also, customer behavior such as probability of 
acceptance based on price offered and the time remaining to depart was studied. The 
pricing strategies were tested using simulation models for three different customer arrival 
rates. Following conclusions were drawn. 
· For a tourist destination where the probability of acceptance was based on price, 
the pricing according to seats remaining was the optimal policy. This policy gave 
a lower average ticket price and higher revenues thus benefiting both the customer 
and the airline.  
· For a business destination where the acceptance probability was based on time, 
pricing according to time remaining generated the most revenue.  
· For a mixed type of destination where the acceptance probability was based on 
both time to depart and the price offered, the pricing according to both seats 
remaining and time remaining outperformed all the other strategies.  
 
 51 
We also investigated the impact of offering indirect (stop-over) flights on the 
revenue generated by considering a network of three cities where travel can be made both 
direct and with a stop-over. Two different strategies were developed. According to the 
first strategy the pricing for both the direct and indirect flights was cheapest at the start of 
the booking period and ended with the last ticket being sold at the maximum price. The 
second strategy suggested a reverse path with the indirect flight being sold at the 
maximum price at the start of the booking period and the price reducing there after.  This 
was done to discourage the selection of indirect flights early in the booking process. The 
first strategy always outperformed the second strategy in terms of revenue generated with 
their difference being significant for an arrival pattern resembling a business destination 
and insignificant for arrival patterns for the tourist and mixed destinations.  
Also the effect of blocking of indirect route until a certain proportion of seats on 
the direct route were sold was investigated. It was observed that this approach did not 
increase the revenue. The model with no seats blocked generated the most revenue.  
The single leg models for the low and medium rate of arrival were tested using 
another example with a different price range, flight capacity and corresponding arrival 
rates. The results were found to be consistent indicating the robustness of the models we 
have developed. Thus, an attempt was made in this research to develop a set of ticket 
pricing policies that could benefit the airline industry. 
 
7.2 Scope for Further Research      
Some of the extensions that can be undertaken to make this research more widely useful 
are: 
1. It is known that every airline overbooks its flights to compensate for 
cancellations, no-shows etc. This extra revenue obtained from overbooking could 
contribute to the overall revenue generated. Hence, the factors such as 
cancellations, no-shows and overbooking could be integrated with the policies 
that have been developed in this research. The impact of these factors on the 
relative performance of different strategies can be investigated. 
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2. These days airlines offer fare prices to customers by taking into account the fares 
offered by their competitors. This competition aspect in the airline industry with 
regards to ticket pricing could be considered. Game theory based models could 
probably be used to investigate this aspect of the problem. The other related 
aspect that could be studied is the impact of alliance or code sharing. Code 
sharing provides a way for both major carriers and established regional carriers to 
expand their customer base by feeding in to each other’s flight networks.   
3. The ticket pricing strategies that we have developed are with the expectation of 
one customer buying one ticket. Discount could be given to large groups buying 
together and hence, this aspect of group bookings may impact the revenue 
generated specially in low demand markets. 
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Appendix A Analysis of Variance 
A1 The Analysis of Variance for the Medium Rate of Arrival. 
Multilevel Factorial Design  
 
Factors:      2     Replicates:    10 
Base runs:    9     Total runs:    90 
Base blocks:  1     Total blocks:   1 
 
Number of levels: 3, 3 
 
  
General Linear Model: Revenue Generate versus Price Offered, Probability  
 
Factor           Type   Levels   Values 
Pricing Strategy  fixed          3   1, 2, 3 
Acceptance Probability fixed          3   1, 2, 3 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Revenue Generated, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source               DF    Seq SS      Adj SS     Adj MS      F      P 
Pricing Strategy     2   116590110   116590110   58295055   4.57  0.013 
Acceptance Prob      2  1685751160  1685751160  842875580  66.01  0.000 
Pricing Strat*Accept 4    13230612    13230612    3307653   0.26  0.903 
Probability 
Error                81  1034331612  1034331612   12769526 
Total                89  2849903494 
 
 
S = 3573.45   R-Sq = 63.71%   R-Sq (adj) = 60.12% 
 
From the above analysis we see that the F values for pricing strategy (4.57) and 
acceptance probability (66.01) are greater than F0.05, 2, 81 (3.15). Hence we can conclude 
that both Pricing Strategy and Acceptance Probability are significant factors and their 
interaction Pricing Strategy*Acceptance Probability is not significant as its F value (0.26) 
is less than 3.15. 
 
A2 The analysis of Variance for the High Rate of Arrival. 
Multilevel Factorial Design  
 
Factors:      2     Replicates:    10 
Base runs:    9     Total runs:    90 
Base blocks:  1     Total blocks:   1 
 
Number of levels: 3, 3 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
General Linear Model: Revenue Generate versus Price Offered, Probability  
 
Factor         Type        Levels   Values 
Price Offered  fixed       3   1, 2, 3 
Probability    fixed       3   1, 2, 3 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Revenue Generated, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source               DF    Seq SS    Adj SS    Adj MS     F      P 
Pricing Strategy     2   135062050   135062050  33765512  4.30  0.002 
Acceptance Prob      2  1502155964 1502155964 751077982  64.49  0.000 
Pricing Strat*Accept 4     1220663    1220663    305166   0.03  0.999 
Probability 
Error               81   943289950  943289950  11645555 
Total               89  2454497317 
 
 
S = 3412.56   R-Sq = 61.57%   R-Sq (adj) = 57.77% 
 
From the above analysis we see that the F values for pricing strategy (4.30) and 
acceptance probability (64.49) are greater than F0.05, 2, 81 (3.15). Hence we can conc lude 
that both Pricing Strategy and Acceptance Probability are significant factors and their 
interaction Pricing Strategy*Acceptance Probability is not significant as its F value (0.03) 
is less than 3.15. 
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Appendix B Method for Calculating the Number of Replications  
The equation used for calculating the number of replications to obtain a specific value of 
half width is 
n = n0 * h02 / h2   [Kelton, Sadowski and Sadowski, 2002] 
where, 
n = number of replications 
n0 = number of initial replication 
h0 = half width from the initial replications 
h = half width required 
 
If the total revenue generated from 10 replication is 39,941 and the half width is 2,329, to 
obtain a half width of 2% of 39,941 which is 798, we have 
n = 10* (2,329 / 798)2  
n = 85.17 which we can round off to 100 replications. 
Similarly, if the total revenue generated from 10 replication is 79,885 and the half width 
is 3,279, to obtain a half width of 1% of 79,885 which is 798 we have 
n = 10 * (3,279 / 798)2  
n = 168 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
